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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Araiza v. RoskowinskiDroneburg:
DENIAL OF
REQUEST FOR
COMPELLED
DISCLOSURE OF
EXPERT WITNESS'S
FINANCIAL
RECORDS IS NOT
AN ABUSE OF
TRIAL COURT'S
DISCRETION
WHEN PARTY IS
GIVEN ONLY THREE
DAYS NOTICE TO
COMPLY.

In
Araiza
v.
Roskowinski-Droneburg, 341
Md. 314, 670 A.2d 466 (1996),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants' discovery request for financial records of an
expert witness employed by the
Plaintiff when the witness was
given only three days to respond to a subpoena requesting
such documents. The court decided against altering the common law rule which would have
required the automatic disclosure of financial statements of
expert witnesses. The court
ruled that making such records
part of "core disclosure" would
be against Maryland common
law. Parties seeking discovery
of such records will continue to
have to follow the proper rules
of procedure.
On January 26, 1989,
Dr. Schipper ("Schipper") performed a laparoscopy on
Heather Jean RoskowinskiDroneburg ("Roskowinski").
The appellee, Roskowinski, received follow-up treatment
from January 27 through January 30 from one of the appellants, Dr. Araiza ("Araiza").
After these procedures,
Roskowinski developed peritonitis and loss of bowel functions which resulted in numerous other surgeries including a
colostomy. Roskowinski filed
a medical malpractice claim
against Araiza, Schipper, and
their medical corporation, Drs.
Araiza and Schipper, P.A..
Dr. Marshall Klavan
("Klavan") provided expert tes-

timony on the standard of care
. in the medical procedures at
issue for Roskowinski. Araiza
and Schipper requested that
Klavan produce numerous financial records at his deposition for possible impeachment
use. Araiza and Schipper, however, failed to subpoena
Klavan's records prior to his
deposition. The requested documents were, therefore, not produced by Klavan although he
did provide testimony concerning several aspects of his financial status from his work as a
forensic expert. In October of
1994, the month the trial was
scheduled to begin, Araiza and
Schipper again requested
Klavan's financial records. To
effectuate this request, Araiza
and Schipper 0 btained two subpoenas requesting these documents, one of which was served
on Klavan at his offices in
Pennsylvania by order of the
Court of Common Pleas of
Delaware County, Pennsylvania, dated October 21. On October24, both parties filed open
court motions in limine on
which the court ruled in favor
of Roskowinski, disallowing
the requested subpoenaed materials.
A jury in the Circuit
Court for Frederick County
found in favor of Schipper and
against Araiza and the medical
corporation. Araiza filed a timely appeal with the Court ofSpecial Appeals of Maryland, arguing that the trial court should
have ordered Klavan to disclose
his financial records. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland grant-
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ed certiorari on its own motion
to determine whether medical
experts could be required to
produce financial documents to
an opposing party for impeachment purposes.
The court began its analysis by outlining the trial court's
rationale for its rulings on the
parties respective motions in
limine. Araiza, 341 Md. at 321,
670 A.2d at 469. The trial court
ruled that requiring Dr. Klavan
to produce the requested documents on three days notice, most
of which were not ordinarily
kept, would be '''extensively
burdensome.'" Jd. Furthermore,
the trial court recognized that
the Defendants could use financial information disclosed in Dr.
Klavan's deposition for impeachment purposes. Jd. The
court of appeals ruled that this
decision was an acceptable exercise of "judicial discretion"
under Maryland Rule 2-51 O( e).
Jd. at 322,670 A.2d at 469.
The court next addressed whether "professional
witnesses" submitting to jurisdiction in Maryland should be
required to supply "written documentation of their forensic
activities." Jd. at 322,670 A.2d
at 470 (quoting appellants' oral
argument). The court stated
that this argument assumes that
attorneys who hire expert witnesses exercise some control
over those witnesses which
would allow the attorneys to
convince their witnesses to
bring such records. Jd. The
argument also assumes that "if
the attorney is unable to convince the expert to do so, the
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attorney would be ethically
obliged to engage an expert who
would produce potentially impeaching records." !d.
Araiza rested this control-based argument on Myers
v. Alessi, 80 Md. App. 124,560
A.2d 59, cert denied, 317 Md.
640, 566 A.2d 101 (1989),
where the court of special appeals held that a party cannot
introduce transcript testimony
of an expert witness in Health
Claims Arbitration when the
expert was unavailable at trial
as a result of the party failing to
pay the expert's fees. Araiza,
341 Md. at 322-23, 670 A.2d at
470. The court of appeals recognized an attorney's duty regarding the use of expert testimony as provided by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(2)(B), which requires automatic disclosure of information regarding the expert's history in testifying. Jd. The court
ruled, however, that an expert's
financial records are not encompassed by this rule. Jd. These
records, according to the court,
are not a part of "core discovery" and will not be provided
without the appropriate discovery request. Jd. The court noted
that it was unwilling to make a
rule requiring automatic disclosure of expert witnesses' financial statements "in light of the
history of core disclosure in the
rulemaking process in this State,
and particularly because any
'adjudication' in the instant
matter would be dicta." !d.
In
Araiza
v.
Roskowinski-Droneburg, 341
Md. 314, 670 A.2d 466 (1996)

the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that the trial court's
denial of requested discovery
of an expert witness's financial
statements was not an abuse of
discretion under Maryland Rule
2-510(e) when the witness had
only been given three days notice to comply. The court once
again failed to reach a determination on whether expert witnesses can be required to produce financial statements to the
opposing party for the purpose
of impeachment. As attorneys
continue to use expert witnesses in medical malpractice
claims, creating the pseUdo-profession of "professional expert," the court ofappeals needs
to more closely define the discovery rules in terms of such
financial statements to allow
the factfinder to use them to
determine this aspect of a
witness's credibility.
- Kevin Barth

